University. His research interests include information theory, cooperative communication, and network coding.
Mode Selection in MU-MIMO Downlink Networks:
A Physical-Layer Security Perspective Xiaoming Chen, Senior Member, IEEE, and Yu Zhang, Member, IEEE Abstract-In this paper, we consider a homogenous multiantenna downlink network, where a passive eavesdropper intends to intercept the communication between a base station and multiple secure users (SUs) over Rayleigh fading channels. In order to guarantee the security of information transfer, physical-layer security is employed accordingly. For such a multiple user (MU) secure network, the number of accessing SUs, i.e., the transmission mode, has a great impact on the secrecy performance. Specifically, on one hand, a large number of accessing SUs will result in high interuser interference at SUs, resulting in a reduction in the capacity of the legitimate channel. On the other hand, high interuser interference will interfere with the eavesdropper and thus degrades the performance of the eavesdropper channel. Generally speaking, the harmful interuser interference may be transformed as a useful tool in antieavesdropping. The focus of this paper is on selecting the optimal transmission mode according to channel conditions and system parameters to maximize the sum secrecy outage capacity. Moreover, through asymptotic analysis, we present several simple mode selection schemes in some extreme cases. Finally, simulation results validate the effectiveness of the proposed mode selection schemes in MU secure communications.
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I. INTRODUCTION
I NFORMATION security is always a critical issue of wireless communications due to the open nature of wireless channels. Traditionally, information security is realized by using complex cryptography technology. In fact, information theory has proven that secure communication can be guaranteed by only exploiting the characteristics of wireless channels, e.g., fading, noise, and interference, i.e., physical-layer security [1] , [2] . The essence of physical-layer security is to maximize the secrecy rate, which is defined as the rate difference between a legitimate channel and an eavesdropper channel [3] , [4] . If there are multiple antennas at an information source, by exploiting the spatial degrees of freedom, the legitimate channel rate is increased, and the eavesdropper channel rate is decreased simultaneously; hence, the secrecy rate can be improved significantly. Thus, physical-layer security coupled with multiantenna techniques has considerably received research interest [5] - [8] .
A. Related Works
Intuitively, in multiantenna secure networks, by transmitting the information in the null space of the eavesdropper channel, the eavesdropper cannot intercept any useful information. However, in the sensing of maximizing the secrecy rate, this approach does not seem to be optimal. The key is to select a transmit direction, i.e., beamforming, to achieve an optimal tradeoff between maximizing the legitimate channel capacity and minimizing the eavesdropper channel capacity [9] - [11] . In [12] , the problem of optimal transmit beamforming in a multiple-input-single-output system was addressed by maximizing the secrecy rate. A potential drawback of the aforementioned approach lies in that the source must have full channel state information (CSI) to design the transmit beam. To alleviate the assumption, a joint power allocation and beamforming scheme was proposed based on the full CSI of the legitimate channel and the partial CSI of the eavesdropper channel [13] . However, it is difficult to obtain the CSI for the source, particularly the CSI of the eavesdropper channel, because the passive eavesdropper will hide itself as good as possible. It is proved that, if there is no CSI of the eavesdropper channel, the beamforming along the direction of the legitimate channel is optimal [18] . Since the secrecy rate is jointly determined by the legitimate and eavesdropper channel capacities, if the source has no CSI of the eavesdropper channel, it is impossible to maintain a steady secrecy rate over all the realizations of fading channels. In this context, the secrecy outage capacity is adopted as a useful and intuitive metric to evaluate security, which is defined as the achievable maximum secrecy rate under the condition that the outage probability that the real transmission rate surpasses the secrecy rate is equal to a given value [14] . The secrecy outage capacity based on antenna selection is analyzed in an uncorrelated multiple-input-multipleoutput (MIMO) system [15] and in a correlated MIMO system [16] . Note that the assumption of full CSI for the legitimate channel at the source also seems impractical in multiantenna systems, particularly in frequency-division duplex systems. To solve this problem, limited feedback techniques are introduced into multiantenna secure systems to convey the quantized CSI from the legitimate receiver to the source [17] , [18] .
Another advantage of the MIMO system lies in that it can support multiple user (MU) transmission, i.e., space division multiple access; thus, the performance is improved significantly [19] - [22] . In [23] , the secrecy rate over MU-MIMO broadcasting channels was well studied. In [24] , a robust beamforming scheme for MU-MIMO downlink networks was proposed by using a Bayesian approach. In MU-MIMO systems, interuser interference is a pivotal factor affecting the overall performance. For a given precoding scheme, a large number of accessing users is beneficial to exploit the spatial multiplexing gain, but it also results in high interuser interference at the users. Thus, it is better to select the number of accessing users, i.e., the transmission mode, according to channel conditions and system parameters [25] , [26] . Interestingly, in MU secure communications, the harmful interuser interference can be used to interfere with the interception of the eavesdropper. Generally speaking, interuser interference has two completely opposite functions. A detailed investigation of the impact of multiuser interference on the secrecy performance was carried out in [27] ; thus, multiuser scheduling was called for secrecy performance enhancement. Single-user selection scheduling was proposed in [28] ; thus, the interuser interference can be avoided completely. On the contrary, the users that the multiantenna system can support at best were scheduled in [29] to improve the sum rate of the legitimate channel. In fact, the number of scheduled users should be carefully selected according to the channel conditions. Therefore, it makes sense to perform mode selection in MU-MIMO downlink networks from the perspective of optimizing the performance.
B. Main Contributions
In this paper, we consider a MU-MIMO downlink network in the presence of a passive eavesdropper. Considering the large CSI feedback amount for multiple legitimate channels, opportunistic space-division multiple access (OSDMA) [30] , [31] is adopted to exploit the MU gain due to its low complexity, small overhead, and good performance. The focus of this paper is on mode selection to optimize the utility of interuser interference in MU secure communications based on physical-layer security. The major contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows.
1) We present a framework of physical-layer security in MU-MIMO downlink networks with limited CSI feedback based on OSDMA, and we propose to transform the harmful interuser interference to enhance wireless security through user scheduling. 2) It is found that, under different channel conditions, interuser interference plays different roles. We derive an explicit expression for the secrecy outage capacity in terms of the transmission mode, the transmit power, the user number, and the channel condition. By maximizing the sum secrecy outage capacity, we obtain an adaptive mode selection scheme. 3) Through asymptotic analysis, we provide some guidelines for simple mode selection as follows. a) At a low SNR regime, the maximum available mode should be adopted. Relaxing the requirement on the outage probability and increasing the number of secure users (SUs) are hardly helpful in improving the secrecy performance. b) At a high SNR regime, the single-SU mode is the best choice, and the multiple-SU mode will result in a zero rate. c) If the number of SUs is sufficiently large, the maximum available mode can asymptotically achieve the optimal secrecy performance.
C. Paper Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II gives a brief introduction of the considered MU-MIMO downlink network employing physical-layer security. Section III focuses on the analysis and design of the mode selection scheme based on the criterion of maximizing the sum secrecy outage capacity. Through asymptotic performance analysis, we present several simple mode selection schemes in some extreme cases in Section IV. Section V presents several simulation results to validate the effectiveness of the proposed schemes, and finally, Section VI concludes this paper.
Notations: We use bold upper (lower) letters to denote matrices (column vectors), (·) H to denote the conjugate transpose, E[·] to denote the expectation, · to denote the L 2 -norm of a vector, | · | to denote the absolute value, (a) + to denote max(a, 0), a to denote the smallest integer not less than a, a to denote the largest integer not greater than a, and d = to denote the equality in distribution. The acronym i.i.d. means "independent and identically distributed," pdf means the "probability density function," and cdf means the "cumulative distribution function."
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a MU-MIMO downlink network (see Fig. 1 ), where a base station (BS) with N t antennas communicates with K single-antenna SUs while a single-antenna eavesdropper also receives the message sent from the BS and tries to detect it. We use h k to denote the kth legitimate channel from the BS to the kth SU, whose elements are i.i.d. zero mean and unit variance complex Gaussian random variables (a homogeneous network in terms of the users' average channels, as in [29] ).
Similarly, we use αg to denote the eavesdropper channel from the BS to the eavesdropper, where α is the relative path loss, and g denotes the small-scale fading vector with i.i.d. zero mean and unit variance complex Gaussian distributed entries. We assume that the BS has partial instantaneous CSI about the legitimate channel through limited feedback and only through the statistical CSI about the eavesdropper channel since the eavesdropper is passive.
The network is operated in the form of time slots. It is assumed that the channels remain constant during a time slot and that they independently fade slot by slot. At the beginning of each time slot, the BS randomly generates M N t -dimensional normalized orthogonal vectors w m , m = 1, . . . , M, where M with the constraint of 1 ≤ M ≤ N t is the so-called transmission mode. For example, select M vectors out of the N t singular vectors of an N t × N t complex Gaussian random matrix. The selection of M , i.e., the mode selection, is the focus of this paper, and we will discuss it later in detail. Then, the BS broadcasts a precoded training vector x = M m=1 w m s i to the SUs, where s i is the normalized training symbol known by the SUs in advance. It is assumed that each user has perfect CSI related to its corresponding legitimate channel through channel estimation, and the information feedback is error free. Then, the kth SU computes its received signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) over the mth beam as
where P is the transmit power on each beam, and σ 2 is the noise variance. By comparing its M SINRs over M beams, the kth SU finds the optimal beam according to the following criterion:
Then, the kth SU conveys index m k and the corresponding SINR γ k,m k to the BS. After receiving the feedback information from the K SUs, the BS selects an optimal SU with the largest SINR for each beam. Thereafter, the BS communicates with the selected M SUs in the rest of this time slot. It is worth pointing out the probability of a SU being selected by multiple beams if the number of SU is large; thus, we neglect it in this paper. For convenience, we use h m to denote the SU's channel vector over the mth beam w m ; then, the corresponding legitimate channel capacity and the eavesdropper channel capacity are given by
. Thus, the secrecy rate on the mth beam can be expressed as [29] C sec,m = (C l,m − C e,m ) + .
Since the BS has no knowledge of eavesdropper channel g, it is impossible to maintain a steady secrecy rate over all the realizations of the fading channel. In this case, the BS can only transmit the signal with a fixed rate. Thus, there inevitably exists the case that the transmission rate is greater than the secrecy rate. Then, the information may be intercepted by the eavesdropper. In order to guarantee the security of information transmission, the probability that the transmission rate surpasses the secrecy rate, i.e., the outage probability, must be controlled within a bearable range. In previous studies, the achievable maximum secrecy rate fulfilling a given requirement on outage probability ε is called secrecy outage capacity R m (ε). Mathematically, it is given by
In this paper, we take the sum secrecy outage capacity as the performance metric. As the name implies, the sum secrecy outage capacity denotes the sum of all scheduled SUs' secrecy outage capacity. Note that given a requirement on outage probability ε, an important factor affecting the sum secrecy outage capacity is the number of accessing users M , i.e., the transmission mode. A large M means higher interuser interference, resulting in a decrease in both the legitimate and eavesdropper channel capacities. Therefore, there exists an optimal M maximizing the sum secrecy outage capacity. In what follows, we focus on the optimal mode selection for such a MU-MIMO downlink network to maximize the sum secrecy outage capacity.
III. OPTIMAL MODE SELECTION
In this section, we concentrate on the dynamic mode selection in a MU-MIMO downlink network according to channel conditions and security requirements to maximize the sum secrecy outage capacity. Prior to discussing the mode selection, we first give a quantitative analysis of the secrecy outage capacity to reveal the effect of the transmission mode. In (6), the outage probability on the mth beam can be calculated as
where f λ m (x) and F λ m (x) are the pdf and cdf of λ m , respectively, and f η m (y) is the pdf of η m . Clearly, in order to derive the outage probability, the key is to obtain the distributions of λ m and η m . In the following, we turn our attention to the analysis of the two distributions.
According to the definition of λ m , it can be considered the maximum SINR on the mth beam through choosing optimal channel h m out of K channels. For an arbitrary channel vector h n with i.i.d. zero mean and unit variance complex
where ρ = P/σ 2 is the transmit SNR (TSNR). Since λ m is the maximum value from K independent random variables distributed as ξ, we have
For η m , since the selection of w m is independent of eavesdropper channel g, it has a cdf similar to ξ; thus, its pdf can be expressed as
Substituting (9) and (10) into (7), the outage probability is transformed as (11) , shown at the bottom of the page, where a(n) = ((exp(−n(2 R m (ε) − 1)/ρ))/(2 n(M−1)R m (ε) )), μ(n) = (n2 R m (ε) + 1/α 2 )/ρ, ν(n) = n(M − 1) + M , and υ(n) = (n + 1)(M − 1). Equation (11) is derived according to the work in [27, eq. 3.3532 ]. W (x, N ), with N being a natural number, is defined as
(exp(t)/(t))dt is the exponential integral function. Since ε is a monotonously increasing function of R m (ε), for a given ε, it is able to find the associated R m (ε) with a certain transmission mode M according to (11) . For convenience, we use G(R m (ε)) to represent (11); thus, (11), we can also derive the interception probability that the secrecy rate is less than zero by letting R m (ε) = 0. Mathematically, it can be expressed as
For such a homogeneous network, if the SUs have a common requirement on outage probability ε, the sum secrecy outage capacity with transmission mode M is given by
In this paper, we intend to select an optimal transmission mode M to maximize the sum secrecy outage capacity. However, due to the complexity of (11), it is difficult to present an explicit expression for M . As we know, given the number of BS antennas N t , transmission mode M belongs to [1, N t ]. In practical systems, the number of BS antennas is quite limited, i.e., N t = 4 in Long Term Evolution (LTE) systems and N t = 8 in LTE-A systems. Thus, we could first derive the secrecy outage capacity for each mode and then determine the optimal mode with the maximum sum secrecy outage capacity. The whole procedure can be summarized as follows.
Algorithm 1 Mode Selection Algorithm
Input: N t , P , σ 2 , α 2 , K, and ε. m = 1, and ΔR is a small positive real value.
Remarks: Through mode selection, we find the optimal tradeoff among the spatial multiplexing gain, the interuser interference, and antieavesdropping; thus, the sum secrecy outage capacity is maximized. As a simple example, if the SNR is sufficiently high, multiuser transmission may lead to performance saturation due to interuser interference; thus, the secrecy performance is impossible to be improved by increasing the SNR. In this context, single-user transmission, i.e., M = 1, may be optimal in the sense of maximizing the sum secrecy outage capacity. Moreover, it is worth pointing out that Algorithm 1 can be extended to a general case with an arbitrary detection technique. Specifically, for a certain detection technique, such as successive interference cancelation, we can derive the corresponding sum secrecy outage capacity or the other secrecy performance metrics, which are always a function of the transmission mode. Similarly, by optimizing the secrecy performance, it is possible to obtain the optimal transmission mode.
IV. ASYMPTOTIC ANALYSIS
In order to reduce the complexity of mode selection, we perform asymptotical analysis in some extreme cases, such as a noise-limited case, an interference-limited case, and a large-SU-number case. In what follows, we investigate the three cases, respectively.
A. Noise-Limited Case
If transmit power P is quite small or noise variance σ 2 is large enough, the interference terms of λ m and η m can be negligible with respect to the noise term, i.e., the noise-limited case. In this case, we obtain a simple mode selection scheme as follows.
Theorem 1: For the noise-limited case, full spatial multiplexing, i.e., M = N t , can obtain the maximum sum secrecy outage capacity.
Proof: See Appendix I. Remarks: From Theorem 1, it is known that, at an extremely low SNR regime, the sum secrecy outage capacity with different numbers of SUs and/or different requirements on the outage probabilities asymptotically approaches zero as the SNR decreases. This is because as the SNR tends to zero, both the legitimate and eavesdropper channel rates approach zero; then, the secrecy rate becomes zero regardless of the number of SUs and the requirement on the outage probability.
Moreover, the interception probability that the secrecy rate is less than zero in such a case can be expressed as
As K approaches infinity, the interception probability in (14) approaches zero; thus, the probability of a nonzero secrecy rate is nearly equal to 1. Then, as long as K is large enough, there is a nonzero secrecy rate with a probability of 1.
B. Interference-Limited Case
If transmit power P is quite large or noise variance σ 2 is sufficiently small, the noise term is negligible with respect to the interference term in the received SINRs λ m and η m , i.e., the interference-limited case. In this case, we also have a simple mode selection scheme as follows.
Theorem 2: For the interference-limited case, the single-SU transmission mode, i.e., M = 1, can obtain the maximum sum secrecy outage capacity.
Proof: See Appendix II. Remarks: From Theorem 2, it is known that, at an extremely high SNR regime, the sum secrecy outage capacity with M > 1 asymptotically approaches zero as the SNR increases. This is because at a high SNR, both the legitimate and eavesdropper channel rates with M > 1 have the same performance ceiling due to the interference limitation. In this context, the sum secrecy outage capacity tends to zero.
In such a case, the interception probability is given by
More interestingly, it is found that interception probability P r (C sec,m < 0) is independent of the channel condition and is a monotonously decreasing function of K. Then, it is possible to enhance wireless security by adding the SUs.
C. Large-SU-Number Case
When the number of SUs K is large enough, one can always find M SUs with orthogonal channels such that the interuser interference is canceled. In this case, we present a simple mode selection scheme as follows.
Theorem 3: For the large-SU-number case, M = N t can obtain the maximum sum secrecy outage capacity.
Proof: See Appendix III. This large-K case cancels the interference completely, which is equivalent to the noise-limited case; thus, they have the same optimal transmission mode. Furthermore, the interception probability in this case can be derived as The interception probability decreases as K and N t increase, and α 2 decreases.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
To evaluate the performance of the proposed transmissionmode selection scheme for a MU-MIMO downlink network employing physical-layer security, we present several simulation results in different scenarios. For convenience, we set N t = 4, α 2 = 0.01, K = 10, ε = 0.05, and ΔR = 0.01 for all simulation scenarios without explicit explanation. In the following, we use AMS to denote the proposed adaptive mode selection scheme, and we use FTM1 and FTM2 to denote the traditional fixed transmission-mode schemes with M = 1 and M = N t , respectively. In addition, we use TSNR in decibels to represent TSNR 10 log 10 (P/σ 2 ). Without loss of generality, we take the sum secrecy outage capacity as the performance metric.
First, we check the accuracy of the derived theoretical results with different path losses. As shown in Fig. 2 , the theoretical results are well coincided with the simulation results in the whole TSNR region. It is found that, at a low TSNR, the sum secrecy outage capacities with different path losses are nearly the same. This is because the sum secrecy outage capacity asymptotically tends to zero under this condition. However, as the TSNR increases, the sum secrecy outage capacity with α = 0.01 is obviously better than that with α = 0.10 since the interception capability of the eavesdropper becomes weak. So far, short-distance interception is still an open issue for physical-layer security.
Then, we compare the sum secrecy outage capacities of the AMS, FTM1, and FTM2 schemes. As shown in Table I , at a low SNR regime, the proposed AMS scheme chooses a highorder transmission mode since the interuser interference is quite small with respect to the noise in the legitimate channel, and a large M can exploit the spatial multiplexing gain and counteract the interception to improve the sum secrecy outage capacity. For example, as shown in Fig. 3 , there is about a 0.2-b/s/Hz performance gain over FTM1 with SNR = −2 dB. When the SNR is greater than a threshold, such as 8 dB, the proposed AMS scheme would adopt the single-SU transmission mode; this is because it is interference limited under this condition, which is consistent with our theoretical claim in Theorem 2. Additionally, at a high SNR, the sum secrecy outage capacity of FTM2 asymptotically approaches zero, as claimed in Proposition 2. Thus, the proposed AMS scheme can achieve the optimal performance at the whole SNR regime, which is helpful for MU-MIMO secure communications with physicallayer secrecy. In general, the proposed AMS scheme determines the optimal transmission mode by comparing N t sum secrecy outage capacities, whereas FTM1 and FTM2 use fixed transmission modes regardless of the channel conditions. Thus, the AMS has relatively higher complexity than FTM1 and FTM2. However, since mode selection is only performed when the channel conditions change, not within each time slot, the complexity of the AMS is bearable in practical systems. In addition, Theorems 1 and 2 can be used to determine the transmission mode at low and high SNR regimes, respectively, which have the same complexity as FTM1 and FTM2, respectively.
Next, we investigate the impact of the outage probability on the sum secrecy outage capacity of the proposed AMS scheme. Outage probability ε represents the interception probability with a given secrecy rate. As shown in Fig. 4 , when ε = 0.01, i.e., a quite small interception probability, the feasible secrecy outage capacity is nearly equal to zero. As ε increases, the sum secrecy outage capacity improves accordingly. For example, that with ε = 0.10 has about a 0.5-b/s/Hz performance gain over that with ε = 0.05 at SNR = 6 dB. Furthermore, the performance gain becomes larger with the increase in the SNR. Note that the sum secrecy outage capacities with different outage probabilities approach zero at a low SNR regime, which reconfirms the claims in Proposition 1. In Table II , it is shown that, as the requirement on the outage probability relaxes, the AMS will be apt to choose a high-order transmission mode, particularly at a low SNR regime. Finally, we show the benefit of the proposed AMS scheme from the perspective of the SU number. As shown in Fig. 5 , with the increase in SU number K, the sum secrecy outage capacity increases accordingly since the probability that the channels of the selected SUs are orthogonal becomes larger. In other words, the interuser interference in the legitimate channel is gradually smaller, whereas that in the eavesdropper channel remains unchanged in the statistical sense. In addition, it is found that the performance gain by increasing K becomes smaller with a large K. For example, at SNR = 8 dB, the performance gain by increasing 15 SUs from K = 5 to K = 20 heavily surpasses   TABLE III  TRANSMISSION MODES FOR THE AMS WITH DIFFERENT NUMBERS OF SUS that by increasing 30 SUs from K = 20 to K = 50. It is because when K is large, the received SNR based on the OSDMA approaches ρ ln(KN t N r ), as analyzed in Section IV-C; thus, the gain becomes smaller by increasing the same SUs as K increases. Moreover, the performance gain by adding SUs is negligible at a low SNR, which proves Proposition 1 again. Similarly, in Table III , it is also shown that, as the number of SUs increases, the AMS will be apt to choose a high-order transmission mode, particularly at a low SNR regime.
VI. CONCLUSION
The main contribution of this paper has been to exploit the benefit of interuser interference to improve the sum secrecy outage capacity in MU-MIMO downlink networks employing physical-layer security. It is found that, under different channel conditions, the interuser interference plays different roles. Therefore, we propose an effectively adaptive transmissionmode selection scheme maximizing the sum secrecy outage capacity. Furthermore, asymptotic analysis is carried out to further the insights on mode selection. For example, our asymptotical results show that, at a low SNR regime, the maximum available mode should be adopted. Both relaxing the requirement on the outage probability and increasing the number of SUs are hardly helpful in improving the secrecy performance. On the contrary, at a high SNR regime, the single-SU mode is the best choice, and the multiple-SU mode will result in a zero rate.
APPENDIX I PROOF OF THEOREM 1
In the noise-limited case, the cdf of λ m and the pdf of η m are reduced to
respectively. Substituting (17) and (18) into (7) , the outage probability in this case can be computed as
Interestingly, it is found that the outage probability in (19) is independent of the transmission mode. Under this condition, M = N t can achieve the full multiplexing gain and leads to the maximum sum secrecy outage capacity. Thus, we complete the proof.
APPENDIX II PROOF OF THEOREM 2
In the interference-limited case, the cdf of λ m and the pdf of η m can be expressed as
respectively. Similarly, the outage capacity is given by
where (22) is obtained according to the work in [27, eq. 0.1553]. In (23) , it is known that ε is a monotonously increasing function of (M − 1)/M and R. Given a requirement on outage probability ε, the sum secrecy outage capacity R is maximized by minimizing (M − 1)/M . Clearly, (M − 1)/M is minimized when M = 1, which proves the claims in Theorem 2.
APPENDIX III PROOF OF THEOREM 3
If user number K is large enough, there is the following important property that λ m → ρ ln(KN t ) [34] . In other words, the legitimate channel capacity approaches a constant log 2 (1 + ρ ln(KN t ); thus, the outage probability is transformed as ε = P r η m > 2 log 2 (1+ρ ln(KN t ))−R m (ε) − 1 = exp − 2 log 2 (1+ρ ln(KN t ))−Rm(ε) −1 α 2 ρ 2 log 2 (1+ρ ln(KN t ))−R m (ε) M−1 .
As shown in (24) , ε is a monotonously increasing function of R m (ε) and is a monotonously decreasing function of M . Given a requirement on outage capacity ε, secrecy outage capacity R m (ε) is maximized with M = N t , which also achieves the full multiplexing gain. Thus, we get Theorem 3.
